By Struan Stevenson
As Iran’s
economy buckles under runaway inflation, a collapsing currency, and mounting
strikes by workers, pensioners, and teachers, the ruling establishment in
Tehran has entered a dangerous new phase – open internal conflict. The slogans
of “unity” and “resistance” endlessly repeated by regime officials now ring
hollow. Beneath the surface, rival factions are battling over how to preserve a
system that increasingly appears incapable of saving itself.
The
divisions have become impossible to conceal. Even regime-controlled newspapers
now openly acknowledge fierce struggles inside the Majlis (parliament) and
across the security and diplomatic apparatus. The latest confrontation erupted
during the May 25 elections for the third session of Iran’s 12th parliament,
where extremist factions mounted a determined effort to weaken Speaker
Mohammad-Baqer Ghalibaf. Although Ghalibaf secured another term, the
infighting revealed something far more significant than routine political
rivalry. It exposed a regime split into two increasingly irreconcilable camps.
One faction believes tactical concessions to Washington and the West offer the
only path to preventing another nationwide uprising similar to protests earlier
this year that resulted in a brutal crackdown by the regime, resulting in over
30,000 deaths. The opposing camp views compromise as existential surrender, a
course that would demoralize the regime’s loyalist base, weaken its regional
proxy network, and accelerate internal collapse.
That
strategic divide now shapes every major decision in Tehran. The diplomatic
front illustrates the fracture with particular clarity. Ghalibaf’s visit to
Doha alongside Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and Central Bank Governor
Abdolnaser Hemmati underscored the urgency surrounding negotiations with
Washington. Talks reportedly focused on reopening the Strait of Hormuz,
releasing frozen Iranian assets, and establishing a framework for de-escalation
after months of regional confrontation.
The emerging
memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran reportedly envisions
a temporary ceasefire, phased sanctions relief, renewed Iranian oil exports,
and the reopening of Hormuz in exchange for continued nuclear negotiations and
maritime security guarantees. The framework reflects pressures on both sides.
Iran’s rulers require economic relief to avert deeper financial collapse, while
the United States seeks stability in one of the world’s most vital energy
corridors without becoming trapped in another prolonged Middle Eastern
conflict. Yet even limited engagement with Washington has triggered fury among
Tehran’s ideological hardliners.
President
Masoud Pezeshkian has attempted to calm tensions by publicly emphasizing
loyalty to the supreme leadership while defending negotiations. In a revealing
statement, he declared that no major decision occurs without the approval of
Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the former supreme leader eliminated on the first
day of the U.S.-Israel-Iran war. Although state media circulate messages from
Mojtaba, he remains entirely absent from public life – no major speeches, no
public appearances, only carefully managed statements distributed through
official channels. There is still speculation that he has died of injuries
sustained during the bombing raid that eliminated his father and other family
members.
That growing
aura of secrecy fuels speculation over succession struggles inside the regime.
Recent statements attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei, calling for a “post-American
regional order” and praising the so-called “axis of resistance,” appear aimed
at reassuring hardliners and proxy militias that Tehran has not abandoned its
long-term regional ambitions despite entering negotiations with Washington. Yet
those same messages also expose the regime’s central dilemma. Tehran seeks
sanctions relief and economic breathing space while simultaneously projecting
revolutionary defiance. Sustaining both positions is becoming increasingly
difficult.
The hardline
response has been swift. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the extremist
newspaper Kayhan, launched a blistering attack on the negotiating team. He
accused diplomats of surrendering Iran’s leverage and warned against any
arrangement that could weaken Tehran’s position over the Strait of Hormuz.
Other hardline MPs echoed the same position. Amir-Hossein Sabeti insisted that
any agreement with Washington would ultimately damage Iran, arguing that
confrontation with the United States would continue regardless of diplomatic
signatures. Hamid Rasaee similarly argued that four decades of hostility
demonstrated America could never be trusted to honor commitments.
Such
statements reveal a leadership gripped by fear. Hardliners understand that
compromise with the West risks undermining the ideological foundations upon
which the Islamic Republic has survived since the 1979 revolution.
Anti-Americanism and permanent confrontation remain central instruments of
internal control. At the same time, economic deterioration threatens renewed
social unrest. Fresh American air strikes against Iranian-linked targets have
further complicated the negotiations. Although U.S. Secretary of State Marco
Rubio continues to insist diplomacy remains possible, the military escalation
strengthens those inside Tehran who argue that Washington seeks regime change
regardless of Iranian concessions.
The Israeli
dimension adds another layer of volatility. Opposition leader Yair Lapid
sharply criticized the emerging interim arrangement, warning that it grants
Tehran economic breathing space while sacrificing Israeli strategic objectives.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to emphasize Israel’s freedom of
military action, yet growing debate inside Israel reflects wider uncertainty
over Washington’s long-term approach toward Tehran.
The greatest
pressure, however, comes from below. Iranian society remains deeply restless.
Workers, teachers, pensioners, and young people continue protesting despite
severe repression. The regime’s leadership understands that another nationwide
uprising could erupt with extraordinary speed if economic conditions
deteriorate further. That fear explains the simultaneous pursuit of compromise
abroad and repression at home. Yet neither faction inside the regime appears
capable of offering a viable long-term solution. The pragmatists seek tactical
concessions that may buy time but risk weakening ideological cohesion. The
hardliners demand continued confrontation that threatens deeper economic
collapse and renewed social unrest. Both paths point toward greater instability.
The
invisibility of Mojtaba Khamenei and consequent uncertainty surrounding Iran’s
leadership, mounting public anger, regional tensions, and widening divisions
between Tehran, Washington, and Jerusalem have combined to create an
exceptionally fragile moment. The central question facing Iran is no longer
whether the regime confronts existential danger. That reality is already
visible. The real question is which strategy will accelerate the crisis first,
compromise that gradually erodes the system from within, or confrontation that
drives the Iranian people back onto the streets demanding the overthrow of the
entire regime?
Struan
Stevenson was a member of the European Parliament representing Scotland
(1999-2014), president of the Parliament's Delegation for Relations with Iraq
(2009-14), and chairman of the Friends of a Free Iran Intergroup (2004-14). He
is an author and international lecturer on the Middle East.
This
article was originally published on townhall
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