Kamikaze Drones and Hostage Diplomacy: The Price of Survival

 

By: Arash Kamangir

When in the documented reports of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and in leaked documents from the IRGC’s clandestine networks, we encounter the footprint of Shahed drones in the war in Ukraine, in Hezbollah’s warehouses in Lebanon, and in the hands of the Houthis, we can no longer speak of a “defense industry.” What is being exported is terrorism packaged as technology.

The Iranian regime has for years continued its survival with a simple equation: Create crisis to remain inside.

The kamikaze drone is not just a weapon; it is a bargaining tool. When this same drone explodes over Kyiv, the negotiating table in Vienna and Brussels also trembles. This is what I call “hostage diplomacy.”

Of course, hostage-taking for ransom began exactly on the first day of the establishment of the clerical regime – the occupation of the US Embassy on November 4, 1979 and holding 52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days, to hostage-taking in Lebanon in the 1980s (the case of American and French hostages), to the assassination and hostage-taking of dissidents in Europe, to the detention of foreign sailors in the Persian Gulf, to the detention of dual nationals like Nazanin Zaghari…

Three sides of a deadly strategy:

1. Sanctioned economy, black market for drones:
Based on the documented book published by the NCRI and extensive research by international centers, the IRGC finances one of its few sources of foreign currency to circumvent sanctions from the sale of cheap but deadly Shahed-136 drones. Every drone sold is a bullet for repression in the streets of Iran.

2. Hollow strategic depth:
By arming proxy forces from Lebanon to Yemen and now to Eastern Europe, the regime seeks to create a human shield for itself. The prevailing thinking is: If Tehran becomes insecure, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and Kyiv must also become insecure. This is not power, but a confession of absolute vulnerability inside the country.

3. Hostage-taking of foreign nationals and diplomats:
Alongside the kamikaze drone, we also have the kamikaze diplomat. The arbitrary detention of dual nationals and their use for blackmail and to free convicted terrorists in Europe is the other side of the same coin. When diplomacy is reduced to hostage-taking, it means all legitimate tools are exhausted.

Forty-odd years of experience has shown that appeasement of this export of death only makes its market hotter. As abundantly documented, the only way to stop the production line of kamikaze drones in Parchin and Isfahan is to place the IRGC fully on the terrorist list and end the policy of appeasement.

The regime exports terrorism for survival and in return buys isolation and political suicide. It is a deal whose price is paid by the Iranian people and world peace.

Sources and Documentation:
For those who want to know more about the depth of this terrorist network, I recommend studying these sources:

1. The reference book of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI):
   The book “IRAN: IRGC’s Rising Drone Threat – A Desperate Regime’s Ploy to Project Power, Incite War” published by the representative office of the NCRI in the US (NCRI-US). This book, with a foreword by General James Conway and Ambassador Robert Joseph, for the first time reveals details of the regime’s use of civilian front companies to supply its illicit drone program.
2. Drone production and copy center:
   According to documents published by the Iranian Resistance, the company Paravar Pars, affiliated with the Air Research Unit of the IRGC’s Imam Hossein University, is responsible for copying and manufacturing drones, ultralight aircraft, and installing cameras and other equipment on drones.
3. Secret test sites:
   The Iranian Resistance, based on information from the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), has also exposed the IRGC’s top-secret sites for testing Mohajer-4, Mohajer-6, and Mohajer-10 drones.
4. The regime’s doctrine:
   As stated in this documented book, since the clerical regime is not capable of producing advanced military weapons, it has turned to producing weapons that can be used for terrorist activities and warmongering with the aim of advancing the policy of crisis-making and fueling terrorism.
5. Arash Kamangir
   Writer and researcher of contemporary Iranian history, focusing on hostage diplomacy and state-sponsored terrorism export

Arash Kamangir
Writer and researcher of contemporary Iranian history, focusing on hostage diplomacy and state-sponsored terrorism exportArash Kamangir
Writer and researcher of contemporary Iranian history, focusing on hostage diplomacy and state-sponsored terrorism export