Iran Faces a Growing Internal Crisis

 

By Chuck Wald

We have passed the six-month mark of the war between the United States and the Iranian regime. Whatever Tehran’s rhetoric may suggest, its theocratic dictatorship is weaker today than at any point since its establishment in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution. As this situation continues to unfold, it is increasingly important for Western governments and the broader international community to consider the policies needed to help bring about change driven not by foreign intervention, but by the Iranian people and their organized resistance. 

The country’s economy, already suffering from years of decline before the war, is now exhibiting some of its worst indicators in decades, including inflation exceeding 100 percent on key consumer goods. Predictably, these pressures have intensified factional infighting within the regime. The turmoil has been compounded by the loss of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war, February 28. 

Khamenei has been succeeded by his son, Mojtaba, following his selection by Iran’s Guardian Council. Yet the transition has exposed a fundamental contradiction within a system that claims to assign ultimate authority to the most qualified Shiite jurist. 

Mojtaba Khamenei’s qualifications appear to rest less on religious scholarship than on continuity with the existing power structure, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). His elevation has reinforced perceptions that the Islamic Republic increasingly resembles the hereditary dictatorship it once claimed to replace, a prospect that many Iranians view with deep skepticism.

The regime’s vulnerability is further compounded by the steady growth of organized, pro-democracy opposition. Since at least 2014, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) has recruited citizens from all walks of life into a network of “Resistance Units” that has played a significant role in four major uprisings over the past eight years. Tehran has responded with an intensified crackdown on these networks and other dissidents, yet symbols of resistance continue to emerge across the country. 

Iran’s judiciary has executed more than 40 protesters and dissidents since March. At least 50 others are reportedly on death row, while dozens, and perhaps hundreds, more could face similar sentences. Yet these measures have failed to diminish support for the Resistance movement, a reality that has been acknowledged by several Iranian officials, including members of parliament. 

First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref recently warned that the threat of renewed popular uprisings could become a precursor to “societal collapse.” His remarks reflect growing concern within the regime itself about the consequences of mounting public dissatisfaction. 

The key to facilitating meaningful change in Iran is to recognize and incorporate the role of the Iranian people and their organized resistance into the international policy framework. 

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the coalition of Iran’s democratic opposition, and its President-elect, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, have consistently maintained that democratic change cannot be imposed on Iran through foreign military action. At the same time, they have argued that Western democracies should sustain political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on the Islamic Republic’s ruling authorities. 

Those forces have already demonstrated a remarkable willingness to challenge the regime, even in the absence of meaningful international support. The nationwide uprisings of 2018, 2019, 2022, and 2026 attest to that reality. So do countless acts of protest, civil disobedience, and resistance across the country. Equally notable was the PMOI’s attempt, prior to the outbreak of war, to storm Tehran’s Motahari Complex, then home to offices and a residence associated with the Supreme Leader. 

That operation, involving 250 PMOI/MEK members in Tehran, signaled both to the regime and to observers abroad that the organization has evolved into a growing and increasingly capable force that sees itself as a viable agent of political change. 

Indeed, that potential has been recognized for years by a number of Western lawmakers, scholars, and foreign policy experts who have examined Maryam Rajavi’s Ten-Point Plan for Iran’s future. The current weakness of the regime therefore represents not only a crisis, but also a historic opportunity. Whether that opportunity can be realized will depend, in part, on whether democratic governments are prepared to engage more seriously with the alternatives to the status quo and with the democratic vision that many of those voices have endorsed. 

More than six months after the start of the war, it has become abundantly clear that the situation inside Iran is increasingly untenable. It is equally clear that many of the assumptions that have guided international policy toward Tehran deserve fresh scrutiny. A more effective approach should begin with a reassessment of the forces most actively challenging the regime from within and of the role they may play in shaping Iran’s future.

Chuck Wald is a retired U.S. Air Force general and former deputy commander of U.S. European Command.

This article was originally published on RealClearWorld

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