Why is Tehran so hostile to a woman leading its organized opposition?

 

Arranged by: Reza Hoseani

Former PMOI Secretary General Zahra Merrikhi (left) raises the hand of newly elected Secretary General Mahnaz Maimanat (right) during the final voting session, Ashraf 3, September 6, 2026.

On September 6, 2026, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) elected Mahnaz Maimanat as its new Secretary General. The PMOI selects its Secretary General through a three-stage election process, which involves progressively broader participation within the organization.

In the first round, the members of the Central Council participate in the selection; in the second round, the heads and managers of the organization’s various sections vote. Both phases are conducted by secret ballot. The process concludes with a third and final round, in which all available members participate in an open vote by show of hands.

The assembly to elect the new Secretary General was convened by Zohreh Akhyani, president of the PMOI Central Council. In the first round of voting, Mahnaz Maimanat emerged as the most popular candidate with 56% of the vote, while Badri Pourtabbakh and Narges Azdanlou received 24% and 20%, respectively.

The clerical dictatorship’s reaction arrived within 24 hours.

Mashregh News, an outlet controlled by the IRGC, has repeatedly labeled Maimanat a terrorist, described the PMOI as a “dead cult,” evoked alleged links to foreign intelligence services, and published a startling headline: “Girl Grooming Gang Leader Promoted.”

The intensity of the reaction, and especially the heavily gendered language, were more revealing than the accusations themselves.

The threat of another model

The PMOI does not place women in leadership positions simply as a token response to clerical dictatorship. For nearly four decades, the organization has restructured its internal hierarchy around female leadership, resulting in an all-female Central Council and the succession of several women as General Secretaries.

This is important because the conflict with Tehran isn’t just about the mandatory veil. At its most fundamental level, the Islamic Republic’s gender order is about authority: who possesses it, whose judgment commands obedience, and what place women are permitted to occupy in society.

The PMOI has developed the opposite response. Women don’t just have rights within its structure: they exercise authority. Men operate under female leadership. Women select other women and ensure their succession to positions of responsibility.

For a regime whose political and clerical leadership positions remain largely the prerogative of men, this is not simply an aesthetic or symbolic divergence. It calls into question one of the fundamental assumptions on which its social order is based.

This is precisely what makes the term “grooming” used by Mashregh News particularly significant . This formulation strips women of any political autonomy. In this narrative, a young woman who joins the opposition cannot have developed her own political convictions; she must have been deceived. A woman who assumes a leadership role cannot represent legitimate authority; she must be dangerous, manipulated, or criminal.

Misogyny is built into the explanation itself.

The public inside Iran

The most important audience for this debate isn’t abroad. It’s inside Iran.

Iranian women and youth have experienced the question of political authority firsthand. They have faced compulsory veiling, arrests, surveillance, and repeated repression. During the nationwide protests that began in late 2025, Amnesty International documented a particularly lethal state response, followed by mass arrests and enforced disappearances.

For this reason, the election of Mahnaz Maimanat is perceived in a very specific context.

For a young woman living under a system that controls her appearance and limits her legal and political standing, a political movement in which women repeatedly occupy the highest executive authority doesn’t simply proclaim a slogan about equality. It demonstrates that a different model of social and political organization has already been implemented by other Iranians.

This distinction is important.

In times of repression, hope rarely arises solely from abstract promises. It also stems from concrete proof that power relations once thought immutable can, in fact, be transformed.

The language of a frightened regime

This also helps explain Tehran’s reaction so aggressively. The IRGC’s propaganda outlet could have simply ignored an opposition leadership election held outside Iran. Instead, on September 7, it published a lengthy attack on Maimanat, her personal history, her family, and, most notably, her relationship with women and girls.

This reaction, in itself, does not measure the PMOI’s presence or influence within Iran. However, it does reveal the political argument the regime believes it must counter.

For a deeply misogynistic system, the danger does not simply lie in a woman’s opposition.

The real danger is the existence of an organized Iranian movement that for decades has lived by the principle that women can lead, that men can follow them, and that other women can elevate them to even greater responsibilities.

For generations who have been taught that the current hierarchy is natural, religious, or inevitable, this represents much more than a symbol.

It is concrete proof that an alternative is possible.

This article was originally published on politicamentecorretto

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