The Concept and Implications of Replacing Ghalibaf with Mohsen Rezaei in Managing the Iranian Regime’s Negotiations with the US
The Concept and Implications of Replacing Ghalibaf with Mohsen Rezaei in Managing the Iranian Regime’s Negotiations with the US: A Surgical Restructuring at the Apex of the Velayat-e Faqih System by Mojtaba Khamenei
By: Reza Hoseani
Abstract
This article analyzes one of the most significant recent developments in the power hierarchy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: the gradual marginalization of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf from the negotiations portfolio with the United States and the consolidation of authority in the hands of Mohsen Rezaei as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Drawing on news reports, official statements, and analysis of recent events, the article argues that this reshuffling is not a mere technical adjustment but rather part of a broader project of power consolidation and homogenization at the apex of the regime led by Mojtaba Khamenei.
1. Dissecting a Power Shift: From Speculation to Ground Reality
1.1. A Change in Washington’s Point of Contact
The most significant indication was the change in Washington’s diplomatic point of contact. The Wall Street Journal reported that JD Vance, Vice President of the United States, had sent a direct letter to Mohsen Rezaei. Mohsen Rezaei himself confirmed: “I have read the letter and have not yet responded to it. The tone of the letter has completely changed.” The Washington Post argued this indicated a shift in Washington’s assessment — that negotiations channeled through Rezaei are considered more effective and that Rezaei is perhaps the only figure capable of forging a consensus among the regime’s competing power factions.
1.2. The Symbolic and Media Purge of the Ghalibaf Faction
Security and military officials from three countries associated with the so-called Mecca Pact — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey — attended a meeting hosted by Iran’s Secretary of the SNSC. Ghalibaf was notably absent. Concurrently, the media committee for the Islamabad negotiations, close to Ghalibaf, was dissolved on orders of a senior security official. The Jamaran website reported Rezaei would appear on state TV — a role previously held by the Speaker. Mojtaba Khamenei had already removed Brig. Gen. Majid Ibn al-Reza, Ghalibaf’s brother-in-law and acting Defense Minister, and sidelined Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Zolghadr).
2. The Significance: Why Does Mojtaba Khamenei Need This Surgical Restructuring?
2.1. The SNSC Secretariat: Mojtaba Khamenei’s Central Crossroads for Decision-Making
Mojtaba referred to the SNSC and its secretariat as the “central crossroads for managing the country’s affairs” [chahar-rah-e tadbir]. Rezaei stated: “Mojtaba is fully briefed on all matters.”
2.2. An Unprecedented Military Directive
Mojtaba ordered that threats at every level must be met with an “immediate and effective response, without geographical limitations” — indicating preparedness for all-out war.
3. The Deadly Dilemma: War or a Strategic Deal
Scenario One: War, Nuclear, Missiles, and Repression — Ghalibaf’s faction sees a deal as regime preservation, so Mojtaba cannot use him. Rezaei’s line: “Not even the slightest amount of Iran’s enriched nuclear material will be removed” and “Until our conditions are implemented, neither will the Strait [of Hormuz] be reopened nor will we negotiate.”
Scenario Two: Drinking the Poisoned Chalice — If compromise is chosen, Mojtaba prefers his fully loyal figure Rezaei to drink the chalice [noushidan-e jam-e zahr] rather than a rival who would use it for power-sharing.
4. The Consequences: Why This Purge Is Not Easily Digestible
- Structural Weakening: Mojtaba lacks public presence and his father’s charismatic legitimacy. Purging Ghalibaf with networks in Parliament, municipality, IRGC and economy shakes the regime from within.
- Accelerating Crisis: Society is in a pre-revolutionary state. Government Week message failed to contain schism.
- Diplomatic Deadlock: Foreign Ministry says “team has not changed” while spokesperson admits “the Secretary of the SNSC decides how to respond to the American letter.”
Conclusion
This restructuring is a high-cost, high-risk surgery not easily digestible for Mojtaba. Yet he cannot delay consolidation. Ultimately, whether leading to war or deal, this internal purge objectively serves and accelerates the prospect of the Iranian people’s uprising, because either path deepens the strategic deadlock of the Velayat-e Faqih system.
About the Author
Reza Hoseani has been writing on political and social developments in Iran and the Middle East for over two decades. His main focus is on strategies to contain the Iranian regime’s warmongering and to support the Iranian people’s democratic movements.
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